Large, unpredictable and not fully insurable health-care costs represent a source of background risk that might deter households' financial risk taking. Using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study and fixed-effects estimation, we test whether universal health insurance, like Medicare for over-65 Americans, shields against this risk promoting stockholding. Households in poor health, who face a higher risk of medical expenses, are less likely to hold stocks than their healthier counterparts. Yet, this gap is mostly eliminated by Medicare eligibility. Notably, the offsetting is primarily experienced by households without private health insurance over the observation period.
Introduction
There is a large consensus among economists and policy makers that the rise of health-care costs has become an increasingly important contributor to household financial risk, in most cases responsible for household large outstanding debt and bankruptcy. This phenomenon has been widely documented for the U.S., where financial hardship caused by out-of-pocket medical expenses is a large and growing problem. Cunningham (2009) estimates that in 2007 about 19% of the U.S. population had problems paying medical bills (up from 15% in 2003) . Doty et al. (2008) increased and was at 62% in 2007 (Himmelstein et al., 2009 ). According to Cohen and Kirzinger (2013) , in the first half of 2011, one in five persons under age 65 struggled to pay medical bills. Even though Medicare coverage reduces the risk of out-of-pocket medical expenses, older Americans are still at risk of catastrophic losses due to benefit gaps (Goldman and Maestas, 2013) . More recently, Austin (2014) documents that, as of 2013, medical debt is the main factor in 18% to 26% of all consumer bankruptcies, while a recent poll by the New York Times and CBS News reveals that for 46% of households basic medical care is a hardship (New York Times, 2014) .
Noteworthy, the fear of financial bankruptcy may prevent people from seeking medical help and/or adhering to prescribed treatments in order to reduce health-related costs. This, in turn, may lead to even worse financial outcomes, as preventative treatments are not rendered and patients end up using expensive ER care as their health worsens (Gindi et al., 2012) .
To the extent that health-related costs are large, unpredictable, and not fully insurable, they constitute a source of background risk. According to economic theory, when individuals face background risks, they should be less willing to bear other risks (Kimball, 1993) and might alter their financial behavior in two ways. The first is to increase precautionary saving (Kotlikoff, 1986; Skinner, 1988; Palumbo, 1999; Atella et al., 2006) ; the second is to reduce exposure to other financial risks (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987; Kimball, 1993; Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Goldman and Maestas, 2013) . In this paper, we focus on the second channel and assess to which extent medical expenditure risk affects household decisions to invest in risky financial assets.
Medical expenditure risk is a function of both the risk of health shocks and health insurance coverage. Other things being equal, individuals in poor health status face a higher risk of incurring out-of-pocket medical costs than those in good health. Similarly, the likelihood of large out-of-pocket medical expenses is higher for uninsured than for insured individuals. The role of insurance in reducing the background risk due to unexpected medical expenses has been recently analysed across several European countries by Atella et al. (2012) using the SHARE data. They show that the presence of a public, universal health care program, as opposed to a private or mixed insurance system, can reduce this risk, thus playing an important role in shaping household portfolio choices with enormous implications for funds allocation.
In this study, we extend this research by identifying and quantifying the relative importance of poor health status and insurance coverage in determining health-related background risk and, through it, household portfolio choices. For this purpose, we exploit the exogenous change in insurance coverage implied by the transition of the U.S. population to Medicare. The universal health insurance coverage offered by Medicare has the effect of reducing the risk of large and unpredictable medical expenditures for everyone over the age of 65 (Barcellos and Jacobson, 2015) .
2 Importantly, 2 Eligibility can also occur before age 65, e.g. for disable people. Yet, about 95% of the U.S. population becomes eligible for Medicare at age 65.
the intensity of such reduction varies with health status and/or with preMedicare health insurance coverage. In fact, other things being equal, individuals in poor health status and/or without (or with low) private insurance coverage before Medicare eligibility may experience a larger reduction in background risk when they become Medicare eligible.
Using longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we adopt a fixed-effects estimation strategy to address the endogeneity of health status and private insurance choices, thereby identifying 1) the role of poor health status on risky portfolio investments; 2) the role of a reduction in background risk stemming from Medicare coverage in promoting financial risk taking; 3) how this latter effect varies with the presence of health insurance prior to Medicare eligibility.
Our results show that Medicare offsets the negative effect of poor health status on household financial risk taking at both the intensive and the extensive margins and this effect is economically relevant. Specifically, Medicare eligibility perfectly counterbalances the negative effect of poor health status, which is estimated to decrease the likelihood of holding stocks by 2.2 percentage points. Furthermore, we document that this effect is mainly driven by households without health insurance, for which the reduction in background risk when they become Medicare eligible is larger: for these households Medicare eligibiliy results in a net increase of stockholiding of 1.8 percentage points, which represents a sizeable 18% increment from a 10% average stockownership probability within this group. Our estimates are robust in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical significance to a wide range of samples selections and model specifications used to rule out potential threats to our identification strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in Section 2 and the main features of the Medicare system in Section 3. Section 4 provides a description of the data set, while Section 5 describes the identification strategy and the empirical model. Section 6 presents the results of the empirical analyses and Section 7 discusses a series of robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
The literature
This paper contributes to both the literature studying the effect of Medicare on health and economic outcomes and the one investigating the role of health status and the risk of large medical expenses on household portfolio choice.
Within the first stream of literature, Gruber and Madrian (2002) Khwaja (2010) and Barcellos and Jacobson (2015) find that Medicare reduces out-of-pocket medical expenditure by 33% at the mean and by 53% for the top 5% spenders, with medical-related financial strain halved after 65.
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The second stream of literature related to our study focuses on the association between health status and household investment decisions. Using 3 A recent study by Mazumder and Miller (2016) shows that the positive effects on household financial wellbeing documented for Medicare are observed in the general uninsured population residing in Massashusetts after the state enacted a major health care reform similar to the Affordable Care Act. In particular, they find that the reform reduced household debt, third-party collections, number of personal bankruptcies and improved credit scores.
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Rosen and Wu (2004) show that being in fair or poor health significantly reduces the probability of holding risky assets as well as the share of wealth held in those assets.
Exploiting the same data, Berkowitz and Qiu (2006) find that health shocks affect portfolio choices, albeit indirectly via a reduction in financial wealth.
Edwards (2008) shows that individuals who assign a higher probability to the event that medical expenses would exhaust their household savings in the next five years hold safer portfolios. Coile and Milligan (2009) 
The identification strategy and the empirical model
Our analysis focuses on both the extensive and intensive margins of a household's decision to hold risky financial assets. Within this framework, we assume that household portfolio choices are influenced by their socioeconomic and health characteristics, as well as by the degree of insurance against unpredictable health-related costs.
Medical expenditure risk is a function of both health status and health insurance coverage. Other things being equal, individuals in poor health status face a higher risk of incurring out-of-pocket medical costs than those in good health. Similarly, the likelihood of large out-of-pocket medical expenses is higher for uninsured than for insured individuals. For these reasons, within the U.S. context we expect the background risk reduction induced by Medicare to have a larger effect on the financial decisions of individuals in poor health than on those in good health. Also, this effect should be more evident for those not covered by other forms of health insurance before being eligible for Medicare.
Given this setup, our empirical analysis aims at testing the following hypotheses:
Hyp.1: Individuals in poor health face a higher risk of large and unpredictable medical expenses, which reduces their willingness to take financial risks;
Hyp.2: For these individuals, to the extent that Medicare induces a reduction in background risk, their low propensity to take financial risks may be mitigated;
Hyp.3: This mitigating effect is larger for households not covered by other forms of health insurance before Medicare eligibility.
In order to empirically test these hypotheses, we adopt the following specification:
where the subscripts i and t denote households and time, respectively. The dependent variable in equation (1) Our analysis is carried out having households, rather than individuals, as observation units since data on asset holdings are only available at the household level. 7 The implicit assumption maintained throughout the paper is that household members take investment decisions jointly, conditional on their individual characteristics, including their health status, health insurance coverage and risk of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenses.
In equation (1) In order to guarantee the causal interpretation of our estimates, endogeneity issues and potential confounding effects need to be recognized and ruled out. First of all, health status is bound to be correlated with observable and unobservable characteristics driving investment decisions (e.g., wealth accumulation and risk aversion). We overcome this problem by controlling for a wide range of relevant variables ( ) and by allowing for household fixed effects ( ).
Second, households in poor and good health before Medicare eligibility, which for the vast majority means before age 65, may exhibit diverging trends in their risky asset holding. These pre-Medicare trends may produce differences in observed financial behaviors after Medicare eligibility, which households may decide to take on more financial risk not because of the reduction in background risk implied by Medicare, but because of their improved health. In our sample, the transition from poor to good health is rather rare (about 4%) and that the likelihood of it taking place remains virtually constant across different ages. We also check whether such transition might induce an increase in stockholding, which could be erroneously attributed to the reduction in background risk implied by Medicare, by comparing the estimates for the full sample with those for the sub-sample of individuals who do not change health status after age 65. Similar coefficients across these two samples reduce concerns about the transition from poor to good health after Medicare eligibility driving the results and jeopardizing our identification strategy.
A further issue is represented by the fact that health status near age 65 may worsen because individuals, especially those in poor health, may wait until they are Medicare eligible to seek the care they need. In this scenario, a positive 3 might reflect mean reversion in health for those in poor health, rather than a differential reduction in background risk implied by universal health coverage (i.e., Ashenfelter's dip as in Ashenfelter, 1978 and Ashenfelter and Card, 1985) . To address this problem, we compare the estimates for the full sample with those for the sub-sample of individuals who do not change health status in the 60-65 window range.
Finally, in order to test Hyp. 3, we estimate equation (1) on the subsamples of households with and without private health insurance before Medicare eligibility. We expect the parameter 3 to be larger for the latter, who should experience a more substantial reduction in background risk.
Cleary, households with and without health insurance are different in many respects. In our regression analysis, we control for a wide range of demographics and household characteristics. Importantly, unobserved heterogeneity, which may lead to different insurance and investment decisions across these two groups, is accounted for via household fixed effects.
Apparently, private health insurance can be purchased to supplement Medicare coverage and this choice is endogenously determined by household changing circumstances over time. To ensure private health insurance status homogeneity within the two sub-samples, we compare households with and without private health insurance over the entire observation period, rather than just before Medicare eligibility.
Variables definition
In our empirical analysis, we consider two dependent variables reflecting the extensive and intensive margins of a household's decision to hold risky assets. The participation choice is modelled via a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the household owns stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts, and 0 otherwise. The allocation choice is analysed using the share of risky assets (stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts) over the total value of household financial wealth.
We rely on the self-reported general health status variable provided by the We adopt different specifications of equation (1) and [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] . Pre-Medicare trends in risky asset holding for households in good and poor health are also accounted for. 12 Household economic condition is captured through separate indicators for the financial respondent and his/her partner being currently working for pay (as above, the working condition of the partner is set to 0 for single households) and for household income and net wealth quintile dummies. 13 Finally, we control for time trend in risky asset holding via wave-specific dummies.
We amend the baseline specification by considering the risk of future health deterioration on household portfolio choices. To this end, we follow Atella et al. (2012) , who propose a novel measure of future health risk based on engagement in risky behaviors (namely smoking, drinking and having a sedentary life-style), as-of-yet asymptomatic diseases (namely high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol and osteoporosis), and grip strength. 14 Thus, in our second specification we include indicators for smoking, drinking and of sedentary lifestyle. These indicators take value 1 whenever either the financial respondent or his/her partner reports engaging in the aforementioned behaviors and 0 otherwise. In our richest and preferred specification, we add 12 We first estimate a cubic polynomial in age for households in good and poor health on the subsample of individuals below the age of 65. We then project this until age 75 and use it as a control in our regression equation. As an alternative, we have also estimated a cubic polynomial on the distance in months from age 65. Both approaches return similar estimates and provide strong statistical support for the absence of diverging pre-Medicare trends for households in good and poor health. 13 Net wealth is the sum of the financial and real assets of the household (including the value of properties) net of financial liabilities. 14 Due to differences in data availability between the HRS and SHARE, we cannot adopt the exact definition of "future health risk" as the one proposed by Atella et al. (2012) . More precisely, while the variables capturing risky behaviors (smoking, drinking and sedentary lifestyle) are fully comparable across the two surveys, the ones on asymptomatic diseases are not, as there is no information on high blood cholesterol and osteoporosis in the HRS. Moreover, HRS data on grip strength have a high number of missing observations, which mine its reliability.
controls for conditions that, while as-of-yet asymptomatic, might entail health deterioration in the future, namely high blood pressure, diabetes and obesity.
The indicators for high blood pressure and diabetes take value 1 when at least one between the financial respondent and his/her partner has been diagnosed with the condition, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the dummy for obesity takes value 1 if the body mass index of one between the financial respondent and the spouse is greater or equal than 30, and 0 otherwise.
We check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional controls. Specifically, we consider whether the household (either the financial respondent or the spouse) holds a life insurance policy as well as its probability of leaving a bequest of $10,000 or more (obtained by averaging the probabilities of bequeathing $10,000 or more reported by the respondent and, if present, the spouse). We also control for cognitive ability as measured by total word recall score (the sum of immediate and delayed word recall). 15 We create an indicator for poor cognitive ability which takes value 1 if at least one household member has a total word recall score below the sample median.
Finally, we account for difficulties in activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL). The ADL score, ranging from 0 to 5, sums difficulties in bathing, dressing, eating, getting in/out of bed and walking across the room; the IADL score, ranging from 0 to 3, sums difficulties with using the phone, managing money, and taking medications.
We create household-level indicators taking value 1 if at least one between the financial respondent and the spouse has any difficulty with ADL and IADL (i.e., has a ADL/IADL score greater than 0).
Throughout the analysis, we use the same set of controls for both the extensive and the intensive margin regressions, as there is no compelling 15 Respondents are read a list of 20 words and asked to recall them in no particular order immediately (which gives the immediate word recall score) and after approximately five minutes (which gives the delayed word recall score).
reason to adopt different specifications for the stock-market participation and the portfolio allocation decisions (Rosen and Wu, 2004) . Finally, in 63% of the households at least one member has been diagnosed with high blood pressure, in 25% at least one member has been diagnosed with diabetes and in 39% at least one member is classified as obese.
Descriptive statistics
Life insurance policies are widespread, as 76% of households in the sample hold one. Bequest motives are quite apparent in that the average household probability of leaving an inheritance of $10,000 or more is slightly less than 70%. Finally, in 37% of the households at least one between the respondent and the spouse performs poorly in cognitive test; in 11% and 5% of the households one member has some difficulty with daily living activities and instrumental daily living activities, respectively.
[ 
Econometric analysis
In Table 2 we estimate a fixed-effect linear probability model for the decision to hold risky assets. 16 The columns refer to three different specifications, the baseline (column 1), the one adding controls for risky behaviors (column 2) and the one adding also controls for asymptomatic conditions (column 3).
Consistently with previous studies, we find supportive evidence to our first hypothesis: households in poor health status have, on average, a significantly lower probability of holding risky assets. Specifically, being in poor health reduces the probability of holding risky assets by about 2.2
percentage points across all model specifications. Our main parameter of interest, 3 , is positive and statistically significant, thus supporting our second hypothesis of a differential reduction in the background risk of incurring large out-of-pocket medical expenses implied by Medicare for households in poor and good health. Interestingly, Medicare eligibility almost perfectly counterbalances the negative effect of poor health status on the likelihood of holding risky assets. Such offsetting effect is economically important given that about 30% of sampled households hold stocks in their portfolios and only 15% of those in poor health do so.
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Concerning time-varying socio-economic variables, we observe a strong and positive gradient for both income and wealth, while the other demographics correlate rather weakly with investment decisions. Contrary to 16 We have also estimated equation (1) via fixed-effect Logit. The corresponding results only partially replicate those presented in the text. In this case, however, the sample size is greatly reduced as the estimation of a Logit model with fixed effects requires individuals without internal variation on the dependent variable to be dropped from the analysis. 17 When we adopt a broader definition of household poor health status (at least one member reports being in fair or poor health), both the negative effect of poor health on stockholding and the sheltering effect of Medicare are, not surprisingly, weakened. Nonetheless, they retain the expected sign.
what Atella et al. (2012) report for Europe, the risk of possible future health deterioration, as captured by smoking, drinking and sedentary behavior as well as by asymptomatic diseases, does not seem to play a role in shaping household portfolio decisions. A potential explanation for this different finding is in data quality between the HRS and SHARE, with the latter presenting a much lower rate of missing observations on variables used as proxies for future health status. Most likely, such different result is driven by differences in the estimation method adopted in the two studies. In Atella et al.
(2012), the effect of future health status on investment decisions is identified off of cross-sectional variation in risky behaviors and asymptomatic conditions. In this paper, it is identified off of within-individual variation in such variables, which is rather modest.
[ Table 3 we present the results of this exercise, based on the estimation of our most complete specification (as in column 3 of Table 2 ). The first column of In Tables 4 and 5 , we repeat all the above analyses focusing on the intensive margin of household stockholding. In these fixed-effects regressions, the dependent variable is the fraction of household financial wealth held in risky assets. 19 The results in Table 4 confirm the negative effect of poor health on stockholding and the offsetting impact of Medicare eligibility, althoug the latter is substantially smaller than in Table 2 and not precisely estimated.
Additional controls
In Table 6 , we augment our richest specification with further controls and present regressions results for both the extensive and intensive margins.
Specifically, we take into account household ownership of a life insurance policy, the probability of leaving a bequest, cognitive ability, difficulties with ADL and IADL.
21 Column (1) shows that households with life insurance are 2 percentage points more likely to participate in the stock market, on average. A higher probability of leaving a bequests of at least $10,000 is associated with a higher likelihood of stockownership, although the estimated coefficient is rather small to be economically relevant. No significant effects are found for poor cognitive ability and ADL/IADL difficulties. 22 While the inclusion of 20 We performed two additional robustness checks, where we focus on the HRS cohort only to isolate cohort effects and exclude households with zero financial wealth. The results of these regressions, available upon request, are in line with the empirical evidence reported so far. 21 Due to the large number of missing values for these variables, the sample size in Table 6 is substantially smaller than the one used for the regressions in Tables 3 and 5. 22 Christelis et al. (2010) find that poor cognitive ability is a strong deterrent for stock-market participation in a cross-section of European older adults. We attribute the difference between these additional variables in the regression equation implies a notable reduction in sample size, it does not affect the estimated coefficients of interest and the conclusions drawn in the previous sections. In columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8), we still find a negative and statistically significant effect of poor health status on stockholding at both the extensive and intensive margins and a counterbalancing role of Medicare, which is substantially larger for households without private forms of health insurance.
[ In order to address these concerns, we repeat our regressions using the sub-samples of respondents who did not change their health status before or after age 65. More precisely, our first robustness check excludes from the sample households changing their health status after Medicare eligibility (age their finding and ours to the different estimation methods and to the fact that cognitive ability exhibits limited within-individual variation (which is the source of variation we exploit).
65-75). Our second robustness check excludes from the sample households with health status transitions occurring between 60 to 64 years of age, that is, before qualifying for Medicare. Tables 7 and 8 report the results for these exercises for the extensive and intensive margins, respectively. As it can be seen, all our hypotheses receive further support from the data. Households in poor health can afford increase their holding of risky assets after Medicare due to a larger reduction in background risk compared to their counterparts in good health. The sheltering role of Medicare is significantly more prominent for those without any form of health insurance prior to Medicare.
It is worth noting that, compared to the baseline results in Table 3 (Table   5 ), recalled for convenience in Columns (1) and (2), the estimate of 3 is almost 25% (15% to 30%) larger when households who experience health transitions after Medicare are excluded from the sample. This indicates that, since the most frequent transition at older ages is from good to poor health, which should discourage risky asset holding, our baseline estimate of 3 can be interpreted as a lower bound of the sheltering role of Medicare.
[TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE]
Excluding individuals who are working for pay
Another potential confounding effect is the transition from work to retirement. This is likely to affect the background risk faced by individuals as it typically implies a shift from a relatively more volatile source of incomeearnings -to a more stable one -pension benefits and annuities. Since normal retirement age is around 65 for most of our sampled individuals, the cessation of productivity risk associated with retirement, especially for those in poor health, may, at least partially, drive our results. To address this issue, we restrict our analysis to households whose financial respondent reports not working for pay during the observation period and who should, therefore, experience little or no change in income risk over time.
23 Table 9 presents the results of the analysis using this selected sample. As shown in columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8), Hyp. 1 and 2 are confirmed: we find an adverse effect of poor health on the likelihood of holding risky assets, which is offset by the availability of universal health insurance through Medicare.
Again, this counterbalancing effect is found only for households without any other form of private health insurance. Yet, our third hypothesis receives less support from the data, as the differences between estimates referring to households with and without private health insurance are now less pronounced and not statistically significant. This finding, however, can be rationalized on the basis of the specific sample selection adopted here. By excluding individuals working for pay, we are presumably dropping households with employer-provided health insurance. As a result, those who report having private health insurance are more likely to hold individually contracted and, likely, less generous policies. This, in turn, makes "insured" and "uninsured"
in Table 9 more comparable in terms of reduction in background risk associated with Medicare eligibility.
Limiting the sample to couples and focusing on both members Medicare eligible
In Table 10 , we repeat the exercise presented in Tables 3 and 5 excluding from the sample single respondents. We also experiment with a narrower definition of household Medicare eligibility using an indicator that takes value 1 if both couple members are Medicare eligible, and 0 otherwise.
In this case, differences across insurance groups are more marked. In particular, for couples without private insurance, poor health status reduces the likelihood of holding stocks by 4.5 percentage points, while it entails virtually no change in the likelihood of holding stocks among couples with private insurance. The offsetting effect of Medicare eligibility is equal to 6.8
percentage points for the average couple without private coverage. It is of a much lower magnitude and indistinguishable from zero for couples with private insurance. The null hypothesis that the parameter 3 is equal for these two sub-samples is rejected at any conventional significance level in favor of the alternative that it is greater for households without private insurance.
Comparison with the results in Table 3 provides suggestive evidence that the sheltering role of Medicare is proportionally stronger in a couple household where both members are Medicare eligible, which, as a consequence, enjoy a larger reduction in background risk. In fact, the net increase in the proabability of holding risky assets for households in poor health who become Medicare eligible is 1.8 for the whole sample and 2.3 for couples. In the case of intensive margin, the estimates show a negative health effect of 7.9 percentage points and a counterbalacing effect of Medicare of 8.5 percentage points.
[TABLE 10 HERE]
Placebo regressions
As placebo tests, we re-estimate our preferred model specification after moving the Medicare eligibility age treshold from 65 down to to ages 64-60.
This allows us to check whether our findings are determined by Medicare or by some other confounding factors/events. Results for both the extensive and the intensive margins are presented in Table 11 . As the treshold moves down from age 65 the magnitude of our parameters of interest is monotonically reduced and statistical significance is lost. When the threshold is positioned at age 64, the results are similar to those discussed above. This finding could be explained by some households anticipating portfolio decisions as they are on the verge of enrolling in Medicare. Also, since our data are collected every two years and we do not consider the month of birth, we may not discriminate well individuals who are "close" and "far" from the 65 age threshold. Some individuals treated as 64-year olds in our analysis may as well be already eligible for Medicare.
Conclusions
In this paper we aim to gauge the potential sheltering effect of universal Column (3) Table 3 Column (4) Column (3) Table 5 Column (4) 
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